Yesterday’s Intelligence Squared / Spectator event was a discussion, rather than the usual debate. There was no motion, and panellists presented possible outcomes. Matthew Parris was mischievous, rejecting all analyses except that “Afghanistan is not Britain’s fight”. What was this “nearly third rate power doing there”? Fighting a war “we can’t afford” against a “cultural and religious identity we don’t understand is mad”. Britain was not fighting at the Afghans’ invitation. “Imagine the card: The Afghan people request and require your presence for a limited military occupation.” He predicted that fellow speakers Lords Inge and Ashdown would espouse the Mastermind approach to foreign policy: I’ve started so I’ll finish. The wrong approach because “Afghan warlords employ the same logic to continue the struggle”. Good sense is to recognise mistakes; Britain should “withdraw immediately”.
Field Marshal Lord Inge did indeed assume the mantle of Magnus Magnusson. “We are where we are. The Kabul government is corrupt; its writ does not extend beyond the capital.” The situation requires “direction and strategic planning”. (In other words, ‘biffing’ followed by redevelopment). The war was “not about beating the Taleban and achieving democracy, but securing the population”. Petraeus’ surge and ensuring NATO partners fight on the front line will achieve success, he claimed.
Clare Lockhart served the Karzai government until discovering that $1bn contracts were sold to cronies for $1. Now she directs the Institute for State Effectiveness. “Afghanistan is not ungovernable or anti-western; it has huge potential”. Until 2005, the coalition worked in “partnership with Afghans”; then the country descended into lawlessness. We forfeited legitimacy and must rebuild it, not with “more bombs”, though the coalition must remain, but by redistributing aid. $2bn packages awarded to NGOs should fund government endorsed projects so that “Afghans can rebuild their country”, protected by capable Afghan forces.
Writer and campaigner Rory Stewart runs a regeneration scheme in Kabul. He praised Lockhart but thought she “underestimates the country’s intractability and poverty”, which frustrates administration. He doubted Petraeus will succeed because Afghans will resist further military incursions. Though Parris was correct to observe that “the gap between our rhetoric and actions is surreal” he was a “false prophet”. We must remain, if only to secure Pakistan. Stewart’s raison d’être is that small things are best. The coalition needs a “light footprint” that builds “from the bottom up”. Secure a district with the local leader, build a bridge and protect it with fairly paid policemen is his model.
Christina Lamb has reported from Afghanistan since the 80s. She perceives a correlation between post-2005 troop increases and an ever worsening security situation, now nearing “meltdown.” Only one of four new Kabul highways is free from attack. “When an official in Helmand commented that ‘great progress was being made: we can now go to the bazaar,’ he meant we drive through it at high speed in an armoured car”. Five years ago, Lamb visited that bazaar alone. Badly co-ordinated military and humanitarian efforts and ignorance of tribal complexities are responsible. Address those and the situation “would improve”.
Professor Anatol Lieven took a regional view. He was sceptical about Petraeus’ plan. “Inserting a large Christian army into Pashtun lands will exacerbate insurgency.” Afghanistan is vital because Pakistan is near “collapse”. Pakistan cannot contain the Taleban because the “majority don’t support a war imposed by the US”. We must learn from the aftermath of Soviet defeat: non-mujahedeen Afghans feared the jihadists and supported the communists. A similar pattern will emerge if we withdraw. The government has a better chance of survival if it cleans up its act and if we improve security services. If the operation is to regain legitimacy before Pakistani eyes, Iran must be involved.
Lord Ashdown has a military bearing and he boomed like some crazed Cockleshell hero. “7/7 made this our fight, but we have made every single mistake we knew would lead to failure...The peace was lost because, tempted by hubris and amnesia, we sought to build Afghanistan in our image”. He demanded “direction” and was incandescent about “young soldiers dying because politicians haven’t got their act together”. The panel and audience agreed: politicians’ dithering has caused unnecessary deaths. Ashdown urged us to “reduce our ambitions”; it is unlikely we can bring democracy to Afghanistan. We will have to “talk to the Taleban, but only once they know they’re losing”.
The audience were asked if they favoured withdrawal, negotiating peace or staying until the Taleban were defeated. As in Afghanistan, there was no clear answer. Perhaps Rory Stewart is right: “Afghanistan must wait for its Jinna”; just hope he’s not bin Laden’s disciple.