Mark Galeotti

How will Putin respond to his latest defeat?

How will Putin respond to his latest defeat?
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Russia is retreating at speed along the Kharkiv front, leaving behind burnt-out tanks and, even more tellingly, undamaged ones, too. There are television images of locals welcoming Ukrainian forces and accounts from eyewitnesses on the spot – but none of that has made it into Russian state media. As the Kremlin struggles to find some way of spinning the unspinnable, this will affect not just its public credibility but also elite unity.

The Russian defence ministry is talking about a 'regrouping' of its units. State TV is extolling the 'exploits' of its gallant soldiers. Government newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, recounting an alleged victory, trips itself up by placing the action deep into formerly Russian-held territory. The tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda’s war correspondent – sorry, ‘special military operation’ correspondent – files gung-ho tales from the front describing not a rout, but an orderly retreat under assault by 'foreign mercenaries' and 'Nato-trained troops.'

The official media is either trying to ignore the collapse of the Russian lines or looking for some ways of excusing or sugar-coating it, but either way the effect is incoherent and unconvincing. In the process, this is demonstrating the key problem of a state-controlled propaganda machine: it all depends on a line coming from above.

Instead, the Kremlin seems to be in disarray at best, crisis at worst. Caught by surprise, unsure how to respond, it is not giving the media a steer, and in a system like this, no one dares show initiative lest they get it wrong. This is, after all, the same Soviet-style defensive thinking that is bedevilling the military, and it’s proving every bit as counter-productive.

The Kremlin has two immediate problems. The first is how to manufacture any kind of positive narrative without resorting to the most egregious of lies. This was the same dilemma it encountered in both Chechen wars and during the Soviet war in Afghanistan: how to lie enough, but not too much.

There is, after all, a strange kind of moral balancing act that obtains in totalitarian regimes. It is not so much that most Russians necessarily believe the official line – though many do – so much as that they are unwilling to put the effort into disbelieving it. It’s too dangerous, both morally and ethically.

Back in the late 1980s, I remember one parent of a Soviet Afghan war veteran telling me 'I didn't want to believe what people were saying about the war, because if I did, then I would either have to act or be a part of it.'

Likewise, today, many Russians would rather leave the box closed and not know whether Schrödinger’s cat is dead or alive. However, the greater the gap between propaganda and reality, the harder it is to avoid the truth.

The Kremlin’s second challenge is how to manage the elite, those who have most to lose but also the best knowledge of what is going on.

A sign of the times is that Ramzan Kadyrov, warlord of Chechnya, has taken to social media openly to complain that 'it’s a hell of a situation' and warning that 'if today or tomorrow there are no changes in the strategy for conducting the special military operation, I will have to go to the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the country to explain the situation to them.'

One cannot take his posturing at face value, as he has a track record of empty rhetorical threats and flourishes. (Just as Russian troops have become exasperated that the Chechen forces seem more interested in posting videos of themselves on TikTok than fighting.)

However, when Kadyrov is admitting that things are going badly, and trying to distance himself from the conduct of the invasion, it is a sign of deeper, tectonic pressures. The technocrats have long been unhappy with the war, but unable to do anything about it. As hawks and opportunists also begin to be willing publicly to signal their dismay, it signals a growing isolation of the president.

Putin is not seriously under threat, at least not yet. But if he feels he may be, then that arguably takes us into even more dangerous territory. It may be that he will find ways to reframe the narrative and try and make peace while calling it a victory. But it may also be that he feels he has no alternative but to find some way of escalating, lest defeat abroad lead to defenestration at home.

Written byMark Galeotti

Professor Mark Galeotti is the author of 24 books about Russia. The latest is ‘A Short History of Russia’ (2021).

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