Putin’s attack dog brings a terrible type of warfare to Ukraine

The Crimean Bridge bombing was an unwelcome gift to both Vladimir Putin – who had celebrated his 70th birthday the day before – and the new overall commander of the 'Special Military Operation,' General Sergei Surovikin. Today, they returned the favour with a missile bombardment of Kyiv and other major cities of the like not seen since the start of the war.

Missiles and kamikaze drones hit a range of targets, some perhaps considered strategic in the loosest sense such as bridges and railway hubs, but most entirely civilian. The west of the country, which has largely avoided the worst of Russian attacks, also came in for an indiscriminate pounding.

The aim was clearly to punish and to terrorise, a revenge attack in response to what Moscow has been calling an 'act of terrorism' on the bridge carried out by 'the Ukrainian special services.'

This should hardly surprise anyone. Putin had to retaliate after the humiliating attack on the bridge that he had personally opened, and which symbolised the connection of Crime and the mainland. Although there is no question – yet – of any serious threat to his position, this was a challenge to his authority, and one being magnified by the hawks on social media and national TV, who were demanding some kind of vicious rebuff.

Just as importantly, Surovikin himself has form. He was a career army officer, who had fought in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Chechnya, as well as serving a tour in charge of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, usually a sign of an officer being groomed for the high command. In 2017, he was put in charge of the VKS, Russia's air and space forces, in a striking break with past tradition.

He served two tours in Syria, in 2017 and 2019, periods which saw especially fierce bombardments of rebel-held cities such as Aleppo and Ghouta. This has consolidated a reputation that precedes this war, of combining competence with extreme ruthlessness. This is a man who regards terror as a legitimate, maybe even inevitable part of war.

Now, as overall commander rather than just being in charge of one of the fronts of the war, Surovikin has greater authority to tap Russia's strategic conventional assets, long-range bombers and Black Sea Fleet submarines carrying cruise missiles. He can now also coordinate operations across the fronts, in a way he could not before.

His elevation to overall field command of the Russian war effort signals an attempt to reinvigorate it. With the anticipated influx of at least tens of thousands of mobilised reservists – others may be being held back to form brand new units rather than just replenish exhausted ones – then there may even be some hope of being able to launch new offensives. This is likely to be a vain ambition, but Surovikin is precisely the kind of aggressive, fighting soldier whom Putin would want in charge, were that to be the case.

I once spoke to a retired officer who had served under Surovikin about what he thought of the man. This habitually mild man, blinked, put down his tea cup, and calmly said. 'A bastard. Through and through.' A Western defence attaché who had met him also commented on the degree to which he seemed constantly trying to hold in fiery, deep-seated fury. This is the man now in charge of the war.

Surovikin – who, in 2004, upbraided one of his subordinates so severely that he shot himself – may be a potential contender to replace the increasingly-derided General Valery Gerasimov as chief of the General Staff, and so has everything to prove. It is doubtful whether he can change the underlying dynamic of the war, as Ukraine fields increasingly well-trained troops and advanced weapons. Nonetheless, he will presumably be expected to try and that is likely to mean many more air raid sirens in towns and cities across Ukraine.