Pity the international diplomats. Hardly back from their Christmas break, they were plunged into yet another dizzying round of declamations and démarches over a fresh bout of Israeli misbehaviour, this time in Gaza. By midweek, diplomacy had achieved a partial success when Israel agreed to a daily pause for the distribution of humanitarian supplies. But it was not yet ready to end the war-fighting.
Crocodiles apart, few would have shed tears for Hamas. All the parties understand that the outcome of the conflict could reverberate far beyond Gaza, with implications for the stability of the entire region.
No one, of course, enjoyed seeing chunks of the Gaza Strip reduced to rubble or Palestinian civilians killed and injured, as in Tuesday’s tragically unintended strike on the al-Fakhura school in the Jabaliya refugee camp. At the same time, few would have been discomfited at the spectre of Hamas taking a hammering. For domestic consumption, Arab leaders hedged their rhetorical bets, condemning Israel for the attack while blaming Hamas for initiating the crisis. In most Middle Eastern capitals, the sale of remedies for aching forked tongues would have defied the credit crunch.
This was evident at a troubled Arab League meeting in Cairo. Following ritual denunciations of Israel, it was left to Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to excoriate Hamas for splitting from Fatah in the post-Arafat era and precipitating the Israeli attack. ‘We are telling our Palestinian brothers,’ he declared, ‘that your Arab nation cannot extend a real helping hand if you don’t extend your own hands to each other with love.’ Less elegantly, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak counselled Arab states that were inclined to support Hamas to mind their own business.
Arab leaders have cause for concern. Firstly, a perceived Hamas triumph against Israel has the potential to ignite the Arab street and destabilise a slew of moderate Arab states from Egypt to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Secondly, and equally menacing, the perception of a victorious Hamas would bolster Hamas’s patron-in-chief, Iran, which has ambitions to achieve not only nuclear capability but also regional hegemony.
Among Arab leaders, none has more to lose than Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of Fatah and President of the Palestinian Authority. While Abbas runs a traditional nationalist ship, Hamas is primarily an Islamist movement that is concerned less about social welfare, education and street lighting than it is about whether to introduce lashings, amputations and, believe it or not, crucifixions as instruments of punishment in Gaza’s criminal justice system.
To that extent, the Gaza campaign is not a conflict of competing nationalisms in one of the most hotly contested corners of the planet. Israel has already ceded the point. Hamas rejects any diplomatic accommodation with the Jewish state and aspires to create a Taleban-style regime on the ashes of Israel. Nor does support for Hamas end in Gaza. It has a deep and broad following in the West Bank. Signs of a Hamas triumph in Gaza could ignite the West Bank and sweep away President Abbas, the Palestinian Authority and any lingering hopes of a two-state solution. The basis for any political dialogue will have vanished.
President Abbas might have experienced intimations of mortality last weekend when he was obliged to send his security forces to save 500 of his own Fatah loyalists from about 2,000 demonstrators wielding green Hamas flags on the streets of Ramallah, the de facto capital of the Palestinian Authority. In that ironic sense, the unambiguous defeat of Hamas in Gaza now appears to be the key to an Israeli–Palestinian entente.
In addition to saving President Abbas (who is labelled a ‘collaborator’ by Hamas) and the peace process, Israel itself has other powerful interests in the destruction of Hamas’s military capability. It needs to halt the constant bombardment of its southern cities and towns. And following the 2006 debacle against Hezbollah — another Iranian client — it also needs to demonstrate that its deterrence has not been eroded; that it has the ability to deal effectively and efficiently with asymmetrical warfare, including rocket attacks from non-state players on its borders.
Early indications suggest that Gaza is no re-run of the botched campaign in Lebanon. By the time Israeli ground troops crossed into Gaza last Saturday night, military planners in Jerusalem were confident that they had learned the lessons of Lebanon. They believed they had accurately assessed Hamas’s stock of weapons and the strategy it was likely to deploy. And they were well acquainted with the terrain where the fighting would take place.
Security sources assumed that Hamas expected the arrival of Israeli troops (though the precise timing was unknown) following a week of aerial bombardment. They also assumed that Hamas had prepared a battle plan that took account of the disparity between the two sides in terms of men and materiel, intelligence and experience.
Hamas, they say, aimed to draw Israeli forces into close combat in heavily populated civilian areas. Such topography would blunt the edge of Israel’s high-tech weapons systems and provide the Hamas fighters with human shields. For that reason, too, Hamas was expected to deploy its forces and weapons in the most sensitive areas — mosques, schools and hospitals, as well as in apartment buildings and market places. It worked, tragically and spectacularly, when it provoked the attack on the UN school in Jabaliya.
The Hamas strategy, like that of its Hezbollah role model, is based on waging a war of attrition using relatively advanced weapons — improvised explosive devices, anti-tank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades — as well as car bombs and suicide bombers, male and female. With Israeli troops drained by their elusive enemy, Hamas hoped to intensify its bombardment of Israel’s southern towns, while using the Palestinian, Arab and Western media to generate sympathy for their cause. In such circumstances, Hamas would encourage the international community to pressure Israel into accepting a ceasefire and claim a famous victory.
That, according to Israeli sources, was the Hamas battle plan. Israel’s priority will be to complete its mission — the destruction of Hamas’s military capability — and get out of Gaza as quickly as possible in order to minimise the risk to its own forces and to Gaza’s civilian population.
What is the endgame? From Hamas’s point of view, victory would be a badly mauled Israel retreating from Gaza with its tail between its legs while its rockets, missiles and mortars continue to fall on Israel’s southern population centres. Business as usual.
Israel’s exit strategy is, not surprisingly, somewhat different. They insist they are not intent on regime change in Gaza. The Israelis, say my sources, would be content to pursue a policy of containment: a ceasefire that leaves Hamas (minus its rockets) in place, along with the sanctions regime — the status quo ante. In addition, Israel would demand the permanent closure of the hundreds of tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt’s Sinai Desert, a conduit which Iran has used to channel weapons, instructors and finance to Hamas. Notably, Tony Blair mentioned this on Tuesday as the key to the ceasefire. Israel would also like international monitors along its border with Gaza. Such a formula is likely to win the quiet support of most Arab regimes.
The abiding tragedy of Gaza is that when Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops and settlers three years ago, it expected that this would be the first step in the creation of a nascent Palestinian state. It would also serve as a model for the far more traumatic business of evacuating troops and settlers from the West Bank. The pity of it all is that, for many Israelis, the experience of Gaza has demonstrated that territorial withdrawal does not make them safer, but more vulnerable.
Douglas Davis is a former senior editor of the Jerusalem Post.