Marcel Plichta
Is providing air defence equipment enough to help Ukraine?
During his first visit to Kyiv last Saturday, Rishi Sunak pledged a new tranche of British military aid to Ukraine. Unlike previous UK support, this new package was entirely focused on air defence: £50 million for anti-aircraft guns (almost certainly purchased via a third party as the UK military does not currently use them), radars, and counter-drone electronic warfare systems. The Prime Minister’s pledge follows a promise made by the UK to provide an additional 1,000 anti-aircraft missiles for Ukraine’s armed forces a few weeks ago.
It’s no mystery why air defence has become a key priority. Since October, Russian missiles and drones have pummelled Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and power plants. The attacks have left millions heading into a harsh winter without power, and more could come at any time.
Russia is working to make attacks on civilian targets in Kyiv and western Ukraine a standard feature of the conflict. According to the Ministry of Defence, Russia is almost certainly using up their long-range missiles faster than they can produce them – but that doesn’t tell the full story. In recent months, Russia has reportedly started using repurposed air-defence missiles for attacks close to the front. Just last week, according to the Ukrainian army, Russia launched a denuclearised cruise missile at Kyiv, indicating that Moscow is willing to get creative to keep the momentum of its bombing campaign going.
Russia’s stocks of missiles may be dwindling, but long-range drones (Shahed 131s and 136s) purchased recently from Iran dramatically increase how long they might be able to sustain their attack. The hope is also that they take the pressure off solely relying on the effectiveness of Russia’s more expensive missiles. The Kalibr and Iskander missiles used by Russia’s army cost millions each, while Iran’s Shahed-136 and 131 drones cost about as much as a Ford Fiesta. Reports that Russia might be moving to manufacture Iranian drones and buy Iranian ballistic missiles also add to the concern that Russia could sustain a much cheaper bombing campaign against Ukrainians than if they were using their own missiles.
The low price of Iran’s drones, however, comes at a cost to their effectiveness. Compared to Russia’s missiles, the Shaheds are slower, easier to shoot down, and have a smaller explosive warhead. However, their expendability means that Russia can use Shaheds en masse to force their way through Ukraine’s air defences and do serious damage to civilian targets. One attack on 17 October used nearly 30 drones to strike Kyiv, damaging buildings across the city and killing four. Ukrainian officials claim to be shooting down more than 70 per cent of Shaheds, but this doesn’t appear to bother Russia – it is willing to lose a good deal of cheap drones if it means some of them hitting their targets. Even a small explosion at a non-military target such as a power plant or substation can do severe damage to Ukraine’s grid.
Simultaneously launching drones and missiles against multiple targets presents a complex air defence challenge – something which Ukraine now faces under much more difficult circumstances than Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Ukraine’s partners are rushing air defence equipment to Kyiv to help, but it might not be enough.
Since October the US has sent NASAMS and Avengers, and are promising the more economical L3 Vampire in the near future. France and Germany sent Crotale and IRIS-T systems respectively, the latter of which Ukrainians credit with an apparent 100 per cent success rate against missiles. Each of these air defence systems have tradeoffs worth considering. Longer-range systems (like the NASAMS) are more expensive while the cheaper systems (like the Avenger) don’t have the range to cover an entire city. The problem is compounded by the fact that attacks often include dozens of drones or missiles, meaning that Ukrainian defenders could find themselves in the right place at the right time, but without enough time to destroy every drone before they start to reach their targets.
An overall shortage of air defences provided to Ukraine presents the country’s leadership with a serious dilemma. Since every power plant and substation across the country is now a potential target, the necessity to cover vast swathes of the country efficiently means making hard choices about where to put the donated air defence systems. Strengthening defences in western Ukraine might, for example, come at the expense of defending Kyiv, which is the most frequent target of Russian terror bombing.
There is also the question of how much air defence should be redirected from the front lines, where Russian planes and Iranian drones also pose a threat. Russian pilots are said to be terrified of flying near Ukrainian air defences, which gives Ukrainian forces a big advantage as they retake territory. Stripping air defences from the front might embolden Russia and make it harder for Ukraine to reclaim the rest of its land.
Finally, there is the matter of how Russia’s bombing is grabbing international attention. There is a risk that, should Russian attacks come to dominate the news cycle on Ukraine, the desperately needed help going to the front lines might be reduced in favor of air defences. Should air defence donations intended to protect cities start to take up bandwidth and funds that could otherwise be used to bring the conflict to a close, it could become counter-productive to Ukraine’s war effort in the long run.
So far at least, international support is matching air defence donations with conventional weapons for the front and support for dealing with winter weather. Nevertheless, partners should be cognisant that efforts to help Ukraine at the front will always benefit Ukrainian civilians at the rear. Sending air defence systems will help in the short term, but the only way to be certain that Russian drones and missiles won’t kill or freeze Ukrainians in the coming months is to help Ukraine win the war.