How the Ukraine crisis ends

Vladimir Putin does not think in the way the West does. Of course sanctions will hurt. But so what? He may be wrong in his strategic calculations, but he is not, as Boris Johnson claimed over the weekend, irrational. Putin is an old-school strategist. This is one of the reasons that sanctions will not have the desired impact. An import ban on Russian gas would definitely hurt the Russian economy, but that seems highly unlikely. Italian President Mario Draghi said on Friday that we should not touch gas. It is now the guy who sits in Moscow, rather than Draghi, who is willing to do ‘whatever it takes’. An import ban on the latest iPhones does not have the same deterrent effect as a continental gas shortage. Don’t fool yourself about the impact of sanctions.

Then there is the related problem of when to launch sanctions. The Ukrainian foreign minister has now called on the West to start the sanctions immediately because Russia is already shelling Ukraine. One can object to this argument by pointing out that, if launched too early, sanctions would lose their deterrent effect. Yet that also happens when they are imposed too late. It will be difficult enough for the West to agree on a catalogue of sanctions, if indeed such a list exists. But it is doubtful that a procedure for agreeing on such a catalogue has been agreed.

So, what happens if Putin calls our bluff? Putin clearly has the stronger cards for two reasons. First, he is willing to use overwhelming military force whereas Nato is not. Second, he is not deterred by economic sanctions, although he may be deterred by the prospect of Russian public opinion turning against him if war casualties pile up. Russian victory is at least as plausible as a war unravelling the Putin empire.

Can he win? Victory might mean the imposition of a Moscow-friendly government in Ukraine or the partition of the country. It could also mean turning Ukraine into a failed state through permanent cyber-attacks and a continued sea and air blockade. All of these are possible. As Foreign Affairs starkly concludes:

“Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will US primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or Nato can ensure peace on the continent will be the artefact of a lost age.

Many of the predictions made in the piece are speculative. One of them is that Germany will lose its position as the leader of western Europe, given its ties with Russia. The two authors, Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, also predict that the main policy axis in Europe will be the one between France and the UK. That seems unlikely. The far more likely scenario is one of a retreating US and a weakening EU.

This article was first published in the EuroIntelligence morning briefing. For a trial subscription click here.